THE first winter of the Second World War brought few remarkable military developments. There was no outburst of activity on the Western Front, no bombing of seaports or other CIties. Only on the seas, and in the subsidiary war in Finland, was action fierce and continuous-unless, indeed, we include the constant activity of the diplomats, an activity in which even the United States, as represented by the enigmatic Mr Sumner Welles, finally took a hand. Then, in the spring, came that intensification of the conflict which had been so widely prophesied. It began with a sudden German assault on Scandinavia, the details of which are still uncertain at the moment of writing.
Before these new developments, the most important single occurrence of 1940 had been the termination of the Finnish war by the treaty signed at Moscow on March 12. Three and a half mon ths of warfare had greatly lowered the mtli tary prestige of the Soviet Union, but had also brought the heroic army of Finland almost to the end of its limited resources; and the terms which the Finns were forced to accept were more stringent than those which they had refused in the pre-war negotiations. Finland lost much tenitory; for the moment, at least, however, she saved her independence--though the surrender of the country's defences brought into many minds the unhappy precedent of Czechoslovakia. The possible further consequences of the Russian victory were anxiously canvassed. That it had been a severe diplomatic reverse for the AHies, who had sympathized with the Finns but had failed to contrive effective aid for them, was universally recognized. What this might mean in terms of increased Russo-German prestige, and its results in Scandinavia or in the Balkans, was a matter of deep concern. It was also pointed out that the cessation of the Finnish hostilities meant an enhanced possibility of effective Russian economic aid for Germany; and the events in Finland had tended to bring the two aggressors closer together. While it was dear that geography, seconded by strong German pressure on Norway and Sweden, had made help for Finland a most difficult matter, the result strengthened those critics in London and Paris who disliked their governments' conduct or the war. In the House of Commons at 270 THE WAR: BLOCKADE AND COUNTER-BLOCKADE C. P. STACEY THE first winter of the Second World War brought few remarkable military developments. There was no outburst of activity on the Western Front, no bombing of seaports or other CIties. Only on the seas, and in the subsidiary war in Finland, was action fierce and continuous-unless, indeed, we include the constant activity of the diplomats, an activity in which even the United States, as represented by the enigmatic Mr Sumner Welles, finally took a hand. Then, in the spring, came that intensification of the conflict which had been so widely prophesied. It began with a sudden German assault on Scandinavia, the details of which are still uncertain at the moment of writing.
Before these new developments, the most important single occurrence of 1940 had been the termination of the Finnish war by the treaty signed at Moscow on March 12. Three and a half mon ths of warfare had greatly lowered the mtli tary prestige of the Soviet Union, but had also brought the heroic army of Finland almost to the end of its limited resources; and the terms which the Finns were forced to accept were more stringent than those which they had refused in the pre-war negotiations. Finland lost much tenitory; for the moment, at least, however, she saved her independence--though the surrender of the country's defences brought into many minds the unhappy precedent of Czechoslovakia. The possible further consequences of the Russian victory were anxiously canvassed. That it had been a severe diplomatic reverse for the AHies, who had sympathized with the Finns but had failed to contrive effective aid for them, was universally recognized. What this might mean in terms of increased Russo-German prestige, and its results in Scandinavia or in the Balkans, was a matter of deep concern. It was also pointed out that the cessation of the Finnish hostilities meant an enhanced possibility of effective Russian economic aid for Germany; and the events in Finland had tended to bring the two aggressors closer together. While it was dear that geography, seconded by strong German pressure on Norway and Sweden, had made help for Finland a most difficult matter, the result strengthened those critics in London and Paris who disliked their governments ' conduct Atlantic but accomplished almost nothing apart from the sinking of the Rawalpindi; she is believed to have reached home in safety. The third ship of the type, the Admiral Scheer, has apparently not been out, and may have been the vessel that was heavily hit in the air raid on Wilhelmshaven on September 4, 1939. The Germans will perhaps think twice before they send another of these comparatively vulnerable ships out to run the ri sks that proved fatal to the Spee. Yet we shall probably hear of other surface raiders before the war is over; and if the fast full-sized battleships Scharnhorst and Gneiunau were so employed they would be harder to deal with than the pocket-battleships. For this reason it is pleasant to know that the fast wing of Britain's capital-ship Beet will soon be strengthened by the first two vessels of the King George V class, with three more to follow. In present circumstances, the British capital ships must not only " contain" the en emy's small but growing battle-force in the North Sea (the Germans have four ships of 35,000 tons or more under construction) but must also bear the burden of convoy duty, providing against the possibility of units of this force getting out into the oceans. ]n his speech in the Hou se of Commons on February 27, Mr Churchill intimated that the Scapa Flow base was abandoned as unsafe after the Royal Oak disaster and that the battle-fleet, at least temporarily, was based elsewhere. He also confirmed that two battleships had been damaged-the Nelso" by a mine, the Barham by a torpedo. This serves to remind us of the hazards to which a blockading Beet is constantly exposed, and of the necessity of maintaining a· large margin of superiority.
The submarine has done far more damage to the Allied cause than the German surface fleet, and has accounted for most of the losses of merchant tonnage. The New York Times computes the total losses to Allied and neutral shipping from all causes down to April 7, 1940, at 1,349,297 tons. This. is no laughing matter; still, a comparison \vith the 2,250,000 tons destroyed during the second quarter of 1917 (a period considerably less than half as long) suggests that the result must be rather disappointing to the Germans. They have sent their U-boats out in su,ccessive waves, and losses have fluctuated accordingly. The worst week of the war was that of February 11-17, during which twenty ships (86,077 tons) went to the bottom. It was a notable fact that fifteen of these were owned by neutral countries. Since the lirst of the year, indeed, the 272 THE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO QUARTERLY Atlantic but accomplished almost nothing apart from the sinking of the Rawalpindi; she is believed to have reached home in safety. The third ship of the type, the Admiral Scheer, has apparently not been out, and may have been the vessel that was heavily hit in the air raid on Wilhelmshaven on September 4, 1939. The Germans will perhaps think twice before they send another of these comparatively vulnerable ships out to run the ri sks that proved fatal to the Spee. Yet we shall probably hear of other surface raiders before the war is over; and if the fast full-sized battleships Scharnhorst and Gneiunau were so employed they would be harder to deal with than the pocket-battleships. For this reason it is pleasant to know that the fast wing of Britain's capital-ship Beet will soon be strengthened by the first two vessels of the King George V class, with three more to follow. In present circumstances, the British capital ships must not only " contain" the en emy's small but growing battle-force in the North Sea (the Germans have four ships of 35,000 tons or more under construction) but must also bear the burden of convoy duty, providing against the possibility of units of this force getting out into the oceans. ]n his speech in the Hou se of Commons on February 27, Mr Churchill intimated that the Scapa Flow base was abandoned as unsafe after the Royal Oak disaster and that the battle-fleet, at least temporarily, was based elsewhere. He also confirmed that two battleships had been damaged-the Nelso" by a mine, the Barham by a torpedo. This serves to remind us of the hazards to which a blockading Beet is constantly exposed, and of the necessity of maintaining a· large margin of superiority. The submarine has done far more damage to the Allied cause than the German surface fleet, and has accounted for most of the losses of merchant tonnage. The New York Times computes the total losses to Allied and neutral shipping from all causes down to April 7, 1940, at 1,349,297 tons. This. is no laughing matter; still, a comparison \vith the 2,250,000 tons destroyed during the second quarter of 1917 (a period considerably less than half as long) suggests that the result must be rather disappointing to the Germans. They have sent their U-boats out in su,ccessive waves, and losses have fluctuated accordingly. The worst week of the war was that of February 11-17, during which twenty ships (86,077 tons) went to the bottom. It was a notable fact that fifteen of these were owned by neutral countries. Since the lirst of the year, indeed, the submarines have been warring more on the neutrals than on the Allies. Previous to January 1, 1940, the British and French had lost 138 ships, the neutrals 90. Between that date and April 7, the Allies lost only 74 as compared with the neutrals' 109. This suggests something else besides German ru thlessness: the effectiveness of the convoy system. The unarmed and usually unconvoyed neutral vessels have been easier victims. On March 26 the Admiralty stated that of 13,673 vessels convoyed by 'the Allied navies since the outbreak of war only 28 had been lost by enemy action. In the last weeks of March and the first week of April there was a decided slackening of submarine activity. This probably arose from the preparations which were in train for the attack on Denmark and Norway.
For their limited degree of succes~ the enemy submarines have paid a high price. The German high command in its review of the first six months of war admitted the loss of eleven, a figure which in view of the increasing Nazi reputation for concealing losses presumably'requires considerable multiplication. The Allies at the same period believed that they had destroyed approximately fifty. The progress made by the Germans with replacements is hard to estimate, though the consensus of opinion among neutral observers seems to be that it has been rather less than had been expected. In any case, as we have already noted, it is much easier to replace the vessels than to replace their crews. There is talk now of the Germans resorting to the use of very small submarines of limited cruising range which can be manned by only a few men. The effectiveness of such craft remains to be proved.
No actual figures can be given for the damage done by German aircraft raids against merchant shipping in the North Sea, but a few general statements can be made with confidence. The losses caused have been very much less than those occasioned by mine or torpedo; the number of ships damaged or destroyed has been very much less than the number attacked; and the German planes employed on this duty have themselves suffered fairly heavily. Incidentally, these planes have been responsible for perhaps the worst brutalities of an increasingly brutal war, the most striking example being the killing of more than 100 persons (mostly Indian seamen formerly interned in Germany) on the liner Domala on March 2. It is of some interest to note that the Domala reached port in spite of having been struck by three bombs. To damage a ship is useful THE WAR; BLOCKADE AND COUNTER-BLOCKADE 273 submarines have been warring more on the neutrals than on the Allies. Previous to January 1, 1940, the British and French had lost 138 ships, the neutrals 90. Between that date and April 7, the Allies lost only 74 as compared with the neutrals' 109. This suggests something else besides German ru thlessness: the effectiveness of the convoy system. The unarmed and usually unconvoyed neutral vessels have been easier victims. On March 26 the Admiralty stated that of 13,673 vessels convoyed by 'the Allied navies since the outbreak of war only 28 had been lost by enemy action.
In the last weeks of March and the first week of April there was a decided slackening of submarine activity. This probably arose from the preparations which were in train for the attack on Denmark and Norway.
No actual figures can be given for the damage done by German aircraft raids against merchant shipping in the North Sea, but a few general statements can be made with confidence. The losses caused have been very much less than those occasioned by mine or torpedo; the number of ships damaged or destroyed has been very much less than the number attacked; and the German planes employed on this duty have themselves suffered fairly heavily. Incidentally, these planes have been responsible for perhaps the worst brutalities of an increasingly brutal war, the most striking example being the killing of more than 100 persons (mostly Indian seamen formerly interned in Germany) on the liner Domala on March 2. It is of some interest to note that the Domala reached port in spite of having been struck by three bombs. To damage a ship is useful to the German cause, but considerably less so than to destroy it.
In the meantime the Allied blockade of Germany has quietly tightened. German merchant ships have appeared on the oceans only as fugitives trying to slip through the net, and not many of the vessels that have left the shelter of neutral ports have reached Germany. Eighteen German ships were destroyed between January 1 and April 7, most of them scuttled to avoid capture; a few others fell into Allied hands. Such vessels as got home probably did so by traveUing through Norwegian territorial waters. Attention was forcibly directed to this practice by the dramatic epilogue to the Gra! Spec affair which took place on February 16. The German naval auxiliary Altmark, having on board as prisoners some three hundred British merchant seamen from vessels destroyed by the Spec, was moving through Norwegian waters protected by Norwegian naval vessels which (in spite of reports in the world press for weeks past that the Altmark was carrying prisoners) had failed to discover her real character. Faced with the refusal of Norway to take action to preven t the prisoners from being carried in to Germany, the Admiralty authorized a violation of territorial waters, and H.M;S. Cossack boarded the Altmark and liberated the captives. Norway's loud complaints were met in London with the declaration that she had herself failed in her duty as a neutral. The British government might further have pointed out that its action had occasioned no loss of Norwegian life or pwperty, whereas Germany had already sunk approximately fifty Norwegian vessels and in the process taken over three hundred Norwegian lives. The whole episode emphasized the singularly unhappy position of the northern neutrals.
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I t is still early to speak of the effects of the blockade on Germany. It appears that rather more than half of her normal imports have been cut off; and the reports of neutral corresponden ts indicate that while the country is very far from starvation it is not so very far from malnutrition. In the matter of raw materials of military importance, it seems clear that the Germans were worried in the course of the winter by the inadequacy of oil supplies from Rumania; and unless they contrive a great increase in the flow thence and from Russia (a matter on which they are certainly working hard, diplomatically and otherwise) they may find their resources in this respect unequal to the demands of an intensified air or land war. Great efforts are being made to obtain metals of military importance by appeals to the population of Germany; but the effectiveness of this procedure must be greatly reduced by the inroads made by the Nazi "war economy" upon the country's normal reserves before real war began. Long before Septem ber, 1939, the German dead gave up to Hitler the iron chains and other ornaments which family piety had placed around their graves. Nevertheless, we must not expect an early victory by the method of blockade. Germany is considerably less dependent than Britain upon imports, and it is only by long cumulative pressure that decisive results can be obtained. The Allied peoples must cultivate the virtue of patience.
II. BRITAIN AND THE NEUTRALS
History has been repeating itself a good deal lately, and not least in the manner in which intensive warfare at sea oppresses neutrals large and small. Just as in 1793-1815, just as in 1914-18, the burden has fallen upon them instantly and heavily. This time it bids fair to be (if possible) heavier than ever before; for both belligerents are doing their utmost to achieve a condition of absolute blockade. And, just as in the previous instances, the operation of British sea-power has drawn numerous protests from those who wish to carryon normal business in a highly abnormal world.
The small neutrals most directly concerned (the Low Countries and the nations of Scandinavia) have complained, but have bowed to the requirements of the British contraband control. Indeed, they had no choice; and they have been able to console themselves with the reflection that, as we have noted above, Britain merely interferes with their business, while Germany destroys their ships and kills their seamen. Moreover, they know well that whereas an Allied victory would be no threat to them, a German victory would be quite a different matter. The plight of these little democratic states is not the least tragic aspect of the war. It has not been improved by the decision of the United States Congress to abandon the traditional American defence of neutral rights at sea, which removed the most powerful motive restraining the Germans from entering upon unrestricted submarine warfare against neutral shipping.
With Japan some difficulty might have been expected, but not much has materialized. The application of a little tact in initiating the embargo upon German exports had a useful effect, and Japan now appears to have accepted this feature of Allied policy. Tact   THE WAR: BLOCKADE AND COUNTER-BLOCKADE  275 by appeals to the population of Germany; but the effectiveness of this procedure must be greatly reduced by the inroads made by the Nazi "war economy" upon the country's normal reserves before real war began. Long before Septem ber, 1939, the German dead gave up to Hitler the iron chains and other ornaments which family piety had placed around their graves. Nevertheless, we must not expect an early victory by the method of blockade. Germany is considerably less dependent than Britain upon imports, and it is only by long cumulative pressure that decisive results can be obtained. The Allied peoples must cultivate the virtue of patience.
With Japan some difficulty might have been expected, but not much has materialized. The application of a little tact in initiating the embargo upon German exports had a useful effect, and Japan now appears to have accepted this feature of Allied policy. Tact was, perhaps, less in evidence in the seizure of twenty-one Germans from the steamer Asama Maru by a British cruiser in the"immediate vicinity of the Japanese coast on January 21; but the surrender of nine of the men to Japan has apparently served to mollify her, and she has avoided the possibility of further unpleasantness by instructing her vessels to refuse passage to Germans who might be liable to seizure. The Allies' apparen t intention of extending the blockade to the Pacific may, however, produce new difficulties with both Japan and Russia.
Italy has been a delicate problem, and yet less so than might have been expected of a "non-belligerent ally" of Germany. Here again the British authorities used tact. There was no undue haste in applying the export embargo to shipments of German coal to Italy, and when pressure was finally applied it soon produced a highly acceptable compromise-Britain releasing the .cargoes she had seized, while Italy agreed to attempt no further shipments by sea (March 9). Germany, no doubt, wiH send some coal to Italy by rail; but this will further tax the German railway organization, which was already in bad shape before the war. Italy's reluctance to make an issue of this question of coal seems significant. It suggests that she fully realizes the advantages of non-belligerency> and is unwilling to abandon them. The settlement of the coal dispute coincided with a hasty visit to Rome by Hitler's Foreign Minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, and a few days later Hitler himself conferred with Signor Mussolini in the Brenner Pass (March 18). These manreuvres were accompanied by a remarkable flurry of rumours concerning co-operation by the two dictators either in a new "peace offensive" or in an intensified war, with Russia presented in a curious variety of roles; but as the dust settled it seemed increasingly clear that Hitler had got little assistance of any kind from the other end of the Rome-Berlin Axis. More recently, however, further Anglo-Italian difficulties have been envisaged as arising out of renewed German commercial activity in the Adriatic.
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The neutral nations of the Western Hemisphere have made intermittent collective appearances on the stage to protest against what they like to call "violations" of the soi-disant Pan-American Neutrality Zone, consisting of lines drawn by them on the map at the outset of the conflict in the hope that this sort of political witchcraft would keep it away from their doors. Since the Zone is entirely devoid of sanction in international law, both belligerent groups have, with great politeness but considerable firmness, declined to honour the protests; and it seems unlikely that this new conception is to have much practical influence on the course of the war-the more so as it has yet to be demonstrated that the naval operations that have taken place within the Zone have constituted any menace to the safety of the western neutrals.
I t remains to consider the special case of the Uni ted States. The withdrawal of American ships from the European war zone has materially altered the problems of American neutrality, and incidentaDy has certainly made American involvement in the war less likely; yet it has not meant the total abandonment by the United States of the defence of what it considers to be the rights of neutrals. The last few months have witnessed considerable friction between British and American authorities: over the searching at Bermuda of mails carried by the Clipper planes, over the taking of American vessels into Kirkwall for inspection (and thus forcing them into an area forbidden to them by the United States neutrality law), and over delays caused by contraband control inspection at Gibraltar. These difficulties, happily, have been less in evidence of late, but some comment on them is in order.
The resentment aroused in the United States by these British actions has been more real than some people in British countries have perhaps been disposed to believe. There may have been a tendency in British minds to assume that sympathy for the Allied cause has been so universal among Americans as to dispose them to overlook discomforts of this type. If so~ it is a somewhat dangerous tendency. It is certainly an error to regard the United States as a sort of non-belligerent Ally. Some Canadian publicists have expressed the belief that isolationism has been declining across the border since the outbreak of war; but the present writer's opinion is the reverse. The Finnish war supplied a remarkable practical example of the state of American feeling. Finland (the debtpaying nation) had long been exceptionally popular with Americans; when Russia attacked it, the American people registered tremendous indignation, which was undoubtedly genuine; their sympathy for Finland was probably greater than for the Allies; yet when it came to sending actual help to the Finns, the fear of in volvemen t reasserted itself, and the help given was late, limited, and relatively unimportant. Americans today are more determined than ever to stay out of the war. As in 1914-17, their sympathies are much THE WAR: BLOCKADE AND COUNTER-BLOCKADE 277 groups have, with great politeness but considerable firmness, declined to honour the protests; and it seems unlikely that this new conception is to have much practical influence on the course of the war-the more so as it has yet to be demonstrated that the naval operations that have taken place within the Zone have constituted any menace to the safety of the western neutrals. I t remains to consider the special case of the Uni ted States. The withdrawal of American ships from the European war zone has materially altered the problems of American neutrality, and incidentaDy has certainly made American involvement in the war less likely; yet it has not meant the total abandonment by the United States of the defence of what it considers to be the rights of neutrals. The last few months have witnessed considerable friction between British and American authorities: over the searching at Bermuda of mails carried by the Clipper planes, over the taking of American vessels into Kirkwall for inspection (and thus forcing them into an area forbidden to them by the United States neutrality law), and over delays caused by contraband control inspection at Gibraltar. These difficulties, happily, have been less in evidence of late, but some comment on them is in order.
The resentment aroused in the United States by these British actions has been more real than some people in British countries have perhaps been disposed to believe. There may have been a tendency in British minds to assume that sympathy for the Allied cause has been so universal among Americans as to dispose them to overlook discomforts of this type. If so~ it is a somewhat dangerous tendency. It is certainly an error to regard the United States as a sort of non-belligerent Ally. Some Canadian publicists have expressed the belief that isolationism has been declining across the border since the outbreak of war; but the present writer's opinion is the reverse. The Finnish war supplied a remarkable practical example of the state of American feeling. Finland (the debtpaying nation) had long been exceptionally popular with Americans; when Russia attacked it, the American people registered tremendous indignation, which was undoubtedly genuine; their sympathy for Finland was probably greater than for the Allies; yet when it came to sending actual help to the Finns, the fear of in volvemen t reasserted itself, and the help given was late, limited, and relatively unimportant. Americans today are more determined than ever to stay out of the war. As in 1914-17, their sympathies are much more anti-German than pro-Ally; and in this mood· much harm might be done the AiJied cause by treating them inconsiderately.
It has often been remarked that between 1914 and 1917 the United States had serious grievances against both belligerents, and that the chief reason it joined the Allies in the end was that whereas they interfered only with Am erican property rights, the German submarine campaign took American lives.' Today, the withdrawal of Ameri can ships from the war zone has deprived the Germa ns of the opportunity to kill Americans; but the Allies are still in a position to interfere with Ameri can trade. In the absence of the German counter-irritant, it is highly essenti al that the AiJies should behave towards the United States with tact and caution . This is not to say that there is any danger of the United States joi ning Germany-far from it ; but repeated incidents suggesting a lack of respect for American rights might have a very serious effect upon American feeling.
Ill. UNANSWERED Q UEST IONS
The war, as spring draws on, is a welter of unanswered questions, military and diplomatic. We will confine ourselves here t o noting one or two of those affecting the war of the navies and the blockades .
. The greatest of these of course is, Can the Allied blockade of Germany win the war? And it appears that this cannot be answered without first answering another, Can Germany get large economic assistance from Eastern and Sou th-Eastern Europe? On this subject there are innumerable speculation s current. Russia as usual is the great imponderable. Nobody knows whether the Kremlin really wants Hitler to win (but it still seems unlikely that a sweeping Germany victory would be welcome). Many observers believe that with the best will in the world Russia could not aid German y effectively without having her economic system largely reorganized by German experts; and this raises still furth er questi ons: Would Ru ssia care to subject herself to a reorganization under such auspices? And if so, could the job be done soon enough to save German y? The answers must be left to time.
The great question-mark of the naval war is the extent to which the advance of the air-arm has affected the power of fleets saili ng ·A n exceUe nt surve yor this subj ect, embodying the: resu lts of th e most re cent historical investigatioDs, is to be found in Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic HiJlor;J oj th, Am~rj(an P~oplt (N ew York, 1940) . See especially Chap. XXXVIII .
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The great question-mark of the naval war is the extent to which the advance of the air-arm has affected the power of fleets saili ng ·A n exceUe nt surve yor this subj ect, embodying the: resu lts of th e most re cent historical investigatioDs, is to be found in Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic HiJlor;J oj th, Am~rj(an P~oplt (N ew York, 1940) . See especially Chap. XXXVIII . on the surface of the sea, and in particular their power of maintaining a blockade. So far, air-power and sea-power have not really come to grips. As we noted in January, the evidence of the early months of war seems to be against the likelihood of the revolution which some people have foretold; but that evidence is incomplete, and only experience of operations on a larger scale will tell the story. It may be that the events of March 16-20, when a German air raid on the British fleet at Scapa Flow was followed by a heavy and persistent series of attacks by the Royal Air Force on the German base at Sylt, are the beginning of a new phase of the war which will answer this question and in the process add new terrors to the conBict. The Germans claimed to have damaged at least three capital ships in the Scapa Flow raid; but on March 19, Mr Chamberlain stated most categorically in the House of Commons that no capital ship had suffered damage, that only one vessel had been struck and that its injuries were minor. Commenting on the stir caused by the raid (which may partly have stemmed from the fact that the Germans for the first time bombed air-fields on shore and in the process killed and injured civilians) the Prime Minister said, "Does anybody think we can engage in a war of this kind without innumerable raids such as this?" Before the autumn, the experts (and others) who for many years past have argued the question of aeroplane verJUS battleship may be in possession of plenty of experi- Finland was to take the form of intensified blockade measures.
A major interes t was the interruption of the German traffic in
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Germany less than a year before) and Norway. On April 9 the German army rolled over Denmark without encountering resistance; but Norway turned out to be a rather different story. True, that same day witnessed amazing German successes: the occupation, not only of the Norwegian capital of Oslo, but of a series of western ports-Stavanger, Bergen, Trondheim, and Narvik-which had thought themselves covered by the British blockade. The explanation of these even ts, as seen at the momen t of writing, appears to be triple: the thoroughness and skill with which the Germans planned and executed the enterprise; the dirty weather in the North Sea which served to conceal the movement from British ships; and last, but not least, the fact that there was treason in importan t quarters in Norway. Thanks to the "gigantic conspiracy" which an astonished American correspondent who was on the ground described a few days later, the invaders came measurably dose to seizing the whole C()untry without a blow. Nevertheless, certain Norwegian coastat batteries and naval vessels inflicted heavy damage on the German navy; and as the country began to recover from its bewilderment military resistance to the German columns gathered and stiffened. It was clear, however, that the ill-armed
Norwegians required immediate and powerful aid, and the Allies set about providing it. The great essential was to strike effectively at the weak foundation of Hitler's new enterprise: the German sea-communication with
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